Extracted log from govulncheck, suggesting that we should bump the
version of golang.org/x/net
=== Symbol Results ===
Vulnerability #1: GO-2024-2687
HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood in net/http
More info: https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-2687
Module: golang.org/x/net
Found in: golang.org/x/net@v0.17.0
Fixed in: golang.org/x/net@v0.23.0
Reference:
- https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/pull/17708
Signed-off-by: Chun-Hung Tseng <henrybear327@gmail.com>
The last step with gRPC update behavior changes auditing to resolve CVE #16740 in 3.5
This PR backports #14922, #16338, #16587, #16630, #16636 and #16739 to release-3.5.
Signed-off-by: Chao Chen <chaochn@amazon.com>
The flag protects etcd memory from being swapped out to disk.
This can happen in memory constrained systems where mmaped bbolt
area is natural condidate for swapping out.
This flag should provide better tail latency on the cost of higher RSS
ram usage. If the experiment is successful, the logic should get moved
into bbolt layer, where we can protect specific bbolt instances
(e.g. avoid protecting both during defragmentation).
This brings consistency between proto-generation code and actual versions of libraries being used in runtime:
github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.2.1,v1.0.0 -> v1.3.1
github.com/golang/protobuf v1.3.2 -> v1.3.5
github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway v1.9.5,v1.4.1,v1.15.2 -> v1.14.6
google.golang.org/grpc v1.26.0 -> v1.29.1
Moved as far as possible, without bumping on grpc 1.30.0 "naming" decomissioning.
Please also notice that gogo/protobuf is likely to reach EOL: https://github.com/gogo/protobuf/issues/691