This commit adds jwt token support in v3 auth API.
Remaining major ToDos:
- Currently token type isn't hidden from etcdserver. In the near
future the information should be completely invisible from
etcdserver package.
- Configurable expiration of token. Currently tokens can be valid
until keys are changed.
How to use:
1. generate keys for signing and verfying jwt tokens:
$ openssl genrsa -out app.rsa 1024
$ openssl rsa -in app.rsa -pubout > app.rsa.pub
2. add command line options to etcd like below:
--auth-token-type jwt \
--auth-jwt-pub-key app.rsa.pub --auth-jwt-priv-key app.rsa \
--auth-jwt-sign-method RS512
3. launch etcd cluster
Below is a performance comparison of serializable read w/ and w/o jwt
token. Every (3) etcd node is executed on a single machine. Signing
method is RS512 and key length is 1024 bit. As the results show, jwt
based token introduces a performance overhead but it would be
acceptable for a case that requires authentication.
w/o jwt token auth (no auth):
Summary:
Total: 1.6172 secs.
Slowest: 0.0125 secs.
Fastest: 0.0001 secs.
Average: 0.0002 secs.
Stddev: 0.0004 secs.
Requests/sec: 6183.5877
Response time histogram:
0.000 [1] |
0.001 [9982] |∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎
0.003 [1] |
0.004 [1] |
0.005 [0] |
0.006 [0] |
0.008 [6] |
0.009 [0] |
0.010 [1] |
0.011 [5] |
0.013 [3] |
Latency distribution:
10% in 0.0001 secs.
25% in 0.0001 secs.
50% in 0.0001 secs.
75% in 0.0001 secs.
90% in 0.0002 secs.
95% in 0.0002 secs.
99% in 0.0003 secs.
w/ jwt token auth:
Summary:
Total: 2.5364 secs.
Slowest: 0.0182 secs.
Fastest: 0.0002 secs.
Average: 0.0003 secs.
Stddev: 0.0005 secs.
Requests/sec: 3942.5185
Response time histogram:
0.000 [1] |
0.002 [9975] |∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎∎
0.004 [0] |
0.006 [1] |
0.007 [11] |
0.009 [2] |
0.011 [4] |
0.013 [5] |
0.015 [0] |
0.016 [0] |
0.018 [1] |
Latency distribution:
10% in 0.0002 secs.
25% in 0.0002 secs.
50% in 0.0002 secs.
75% in 0.0002 secs.
90% in 0.0003 secs.
95% in 0.0003 secs.
99% in 0.0004 secs.
Would retry a few times before returning a not primary error that
the client should never see. Instead, use proper timeouts and
then return a request timeout error on failure.
Fixes#6922
This exists to prevent sending too many requests that
would lead into applier falling behind Raft accepting-proposal.
Based on recent benchmarks, etcd was able to process high workloads
(2 million writes with 1K concurrent clients).
The limit 1000 is too conservative to test those high workloads.
Address https://github.com/coreos/etcd/issues/6754.
In case there are network errors or unexpected EOF errors
in TimeToLive http requests to leader, we translate that into
ErrNoLeader, and expects the client to retry its request.
The cost of bcrypt password checking is quite high (almost 100ms on a
modern machine) so executing it in apply loop will be
problematic. This commit exclude the checking mechanism to the API
layer. The password checking is validated with the OCC like way
similar to the auth of serializable get.
This commit also removes a unit test of Authenticate RPC from
auth/store_test.go. It is because the RPC now accepts an auth request
unconditionally and delegates the checking functionality to
authStore.CheckPassword() (so a unit test for CheckPassword() is
added). The combination of the two functionalities can be tested by
e2e (e.g. TestCtlV3AuthWriteKey).
Fixes https://github.com/coreos/etcd/issues/6530
When the non Leader etcd server receives a LeaseTimeToLive on a nonexistent lease, it responds with a nil resp and a nil error The invoking function parses the nil resp and results a segmentation fault.
I fix the bug by making sure the lease not found error is returned so that the invoking function parses the the error message instead.
fix#6537
All outstanding goroutines now go into the etcdserver waitgroup. goroutines are
shutdown with a "stopping" channel which is closed when the run() goroutine
shutsdown. The done channel will only close once the waitgroup is totally cleared.
This commit introduces revision of authStore. The revision number
represents a version of authStore that is incremented by updating auth
related information.
The revision is required for avoiding TOCTOU problems. Currently there
are two types of the TOCTOU problems in v3 auth.
The first one is in ordinal linearizable requests with a sequence like
below ():
1. Request from client CA is processed in follower FA. FA looks up the
username (let it U) for the request from a token of the request. At
this time, the request is authorized correctly.
2. Another request from client CB is processed in follower FB. CB
is for changing U's password.
3. FB forwards the request from CB to the leader before FA. Now U's
password is updated and the request from CA should be rejected.
4. However, the request from CA is processed by the leader because
authentication is already done in FA.
For avoiding the above sequence, this commit lets
etcdserverpb.RequestHeader have a member revision. The member is
initialized during authentication by followers and checked in a
leader. If the revision in RequestHeader is lower than the leader's
authStore revision, it means a sequence like above happened. In such a
case, the state machine returns auth.ErrAuthRevisionObsolete. The
error code lets nodes retry their requests.
The second one, a case of serializable range and txn, is more
subtle. Because these requests are processed in follower directly. The
TOCTOU problem can be caused by a sequence like below:
1. Serializable request from client CA is processed in follower FA. At
first, FA looks up the username (let it U) and its permission
before actual access to KV.
2. Another request from client CB is processed in follower FB and
forwarded to the leader. The cluster including FA now commits a log
entry of the request from CB. Assume the request changed the
permission or password of U.
3. Now the serializable request from CA is accessing to KV. Even if
the access is allowed at the point of 1, now it can be invalid
because of the change introduced in 2.
For avoiding the above sequence, this commit lets the functions of
serializable requests (EtcdServer.Range() and EtcdServer.Txn())
compare the revision in the request header with the latest revision of
authStore after the actual access. If the saved revision is lower than
the latest one, it means the permission can be changed. Although it
would introduce false positives (e.g. changing other user's password),
it prevents the TOCTOU problem. This idea is an implementation of
Anthony's comment:
https://github.com/coreos/etcd/pull/5739#issuecomment-228128254
This commit expands RPCs for getting user and role and support list up
all users and roles. etcdctl v3 is now support getting all users and
roles with the newly added option --all e.g. etcdctl user get --all
