Progress notifications requested using ProgressRequest were sent
directly using the ctrlStream, which means that they could race
against watch responses in the watchStream.
This would especially happen when the stream was not synced - e.g. if
you requested a progress notification on a freshly created unsynced
watcher, the notification would typically arrive indicating a revision
for which not all watch responses had been sent.
This changes the behaviour so that v3rpc always goes through the watch
stream, using a new RequestProgressAll function that closely matches
the behaviour of the v3rpc code - i.e.
1. Generate a message with WatchId -1, indicating the revision for
*all* watchers in the stream
2. Guarantee that a response is (eventually) sent
The latter might require us to defer the response until all watchers
are synced, which is likely as it should be. Note that we do *not*
guarantee that the number of progress notifications matches the number
of requests, only that eventually at least one gets sent.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Wang <wachao@vmware.com>
When etcdserver receives a LeaseRenew request, it may be still in
progress of processing the LeaseGrantRequest on exact the same
leaseID. Accordingly it may return a TTL=0 to client due to the
leaseID not found error. So the leader should wait for the appliedID
to be available before processing client requests.
Previously the SetConsistentIndex() is called during the apply workflow,
but it's outside the db transaction. If a commit happens between SetConsistentIndex
and the following apply workflow, and etcd crashes for whatever reason right
after the commit, then etcd commits an incomplete transaction to db.
Eventually etcd runs into the data inconsistency issue.
In this commit, we move the SetConsistentIndex into a txPostLockHook, so
it will be executed inside the transaction lock.
Prevent etcd from crashing when given a bad grant payload, e.g.:
$ curl -d '{"name": "foo"}' http://localhost:2379/v3/auth/role/add
{"header":{"cluster_id":"14841639068965178418", ...
$ curl -d '{"name": "foo"}' http://localhost:2379/v3/auth/role/grant
curl: (52) Empty reply from server
Signed-off-by: Gyuho Lee <leegyuho@amazon.com>
Thanks to this change:
- all the maps bucket -> buffer are indexed by int's instead of
string. No need to do: byte[] -> string -> hash conversion on each
access.
- buckets are strongly typed in backend/mvcc API.
This makes (bbolt) backend a full feature snapshot in term of WAL/raft,
i.e. carries:
- commit : (applied_index)
- confState
Benefits:
- Backend will be a sufficient point in time definition sufficient to
start replaying WAL. We have applied_index & confState in consistent
state.
- In case of emergency a backend state can be used for recovery
correct 'backend' (bbolt) context in aspect of membership.
Prior to this change the 'restored' backend used to still contain:
- old memberid (mvcc deletion used, why the membership is in bolt
bucket, but not mvcc part):
```
mvs := mvcc.NewStore(s.lg, be, lessor, ci, mvcc.StoreConfig{CompactionBatchLimit: math.MaxInt32})
defer mvs.Close()
txn := mvs.Write(traceutil.TODO())
btx := be.BatchTx()
del := func(k, v []byte) error {
txn.DeleteRange(k, nil)
return nil
}
// delete stored members from old cluster since using new members
btx.UnsafeForEach([]byte("members"), del)
```
- didn't get new members added.
ClusterVersionSet, ClusterMemberAttrSet, DowngradeInfoSet functions are
writing both to V2store and backend. Prior this CL there were
in a branch not executed if shouldApplyV3 was false,
e.g. during restore when Backend is up-to-date (has high
consistency-index) while v2store requires replay from WAL log.
The most serious consequence of this bug was that v2store after restore
could have different index (revision) than the same exact store before restore,
so potentially different content between replicas.
Also this change is supressing double-applying of Membership
(ClusterConfig) changes on Backend (store v3) - that lackilly are not
part of MVCC/KeyValue store, so they didn't caused Revisions to be
bumped.
Inspired by jingyih@ comment:
https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/pull/12820#issuecomment-815299406
While it appears that etcd is not vulnerable to CVE-2021-3121,
it is a good idea to update to the new generator so that new
vulnerable code isn't generated in any future APIs. Also, this
lays the issue to rest of whether there is any issue with
etcd and CVE-2021-3121.
