* [NOD-373] Implement Schnorr digital signatures and remove ECDSA (based on code from gcash/bchd)
* [NOD-374] Add new error to list; Update comments.
* [NOD-373] Remove leftovers of verifyMessage RPC command (which was deleted)
* [NOD-373] Remove redundant test, add Schnorr tests, and fix tests where needed
* [NOD-373] Fix tests and remove redundant ones
* [NOD-373] Refactor functions names
* [NOD-373] Remove empty line
* [NOD-373] Fix comments, rename functions to more meaningful names
* [NOD-373] Additional data in nonceRFC6979 should not be nil
* [NOD-373] Refactor function name
* [NOD-373] Add permalinks for links to bchd code
This is mostly a backport of some of the same modifications made in
Decred along with a few additional things cleaned up. In particular,
this updates the code to make use of the new chainhash package.
Also, since this required API changes anyways and the hash algorithm is
no longer tied specifically to SHA, all other functions throughout the
code base which had "Sha" in their name have been changed to Hash so
they are not incorrectly implying the hash algorithm.
The following is an overview of the changes:
- Remove the wire.ShaHash type
- Update all references to wire.ShaHash to the new chainhash.Hash type
- Rename the following functions and update all references:
- wire.BlockHeader.BlockSha -> BlockHash
- wire.MsgBlock.BlockSha -> BlockHash
- wire.MsgBlock.TxShas -> TxHashes
- wire.MsgTx.TxSha -> TxHash
- blockchain.ShaHashToBig -> HashToBig
- peer.ShaFunc -> peer.HashFunc
- Rename all variables that included sha in their name to include hash
instead
- Update for function name changes in other dependent packages such as
btcutil
- Update copyright dates on all modified files
- Update glide.lock file to use the required version of btcutil
Introduce an ECDSA signature verification into btcd in order to
mitigate a certain DoS attack and as a performance optimization.
The benefits of SigCache are two fold. Firstly, usage of SigCache
mitigates a DoS attack wherein an attacker causes a victim's client to
hang due to worst-case behavior triggered while processing attacker
crafted invalid transactions. A detailed description of the mitigated
DoS attack can be found here: https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2013/01/23/fixed-bitcoin-vulnerability-explanation-why-the-signature-cache-is-a-dos-protection/
Secondly, usage of the SigCache introduces a signature verification
optimization which speeds up the validation of transactions within a
block, if they've already been seen and verified within the mempool.
The server itself manages the sigCache instance. The blockManager and
txMempool respectively now receive pointers to the created sigCache
instance. All read (sig triplet existence) operations on the sigCache
will not block unless a separate goroutine is adding an entry (writing)
to the sigCache. GetBlockTemplate generation now also utilizes the
sigCache in order to avoid unnecessarily double checking signatures
when generating a template after previously accepting a txn to the
mempool. Consequently, the CPU miner now also employs the same
optimization.
The maximum number of entries for the sigCache has been introduced as a
config parameter in order to allow users to configure the amount of
memory consumed by this new additional caching.
