As per the spec, v6 keys must not use the legacy curve25519 format.
The new format is not used by default with v4 keys as it's not compatible with OpenPGP.js older than v5.10.0 .
However, v6 keys already break compatibility, so if the user requests them via config flag, we can safely use the new curve format as well.
Determine whether AEAD should be used for encryption solely based the encryption key preferences.
Previously, the config flag was also used to control the behaviour, since AEAD messages were not standardised nor widely supported.
To generate keys that declare AEAD in their preferences, use `generateKey` with `config.aeadProtect = true`.
This special cipher value can be relevant for unencrypted private keys:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#section-12.2.1 .
However, it is no longer used internally, and on the contrary it could cause
confusion on SKESK decryption, where "random" cipher algos are returned in case
of wrong password.
This change also fixes a flaky test on password-based decryption, caused by the
PKESK v6 changes which add support for `null` cipher algos. The code did not
distinguish between a `null` and a `0` (plaintext) algo identifier, and would
break when the latter was returned on SKESK decryption.
The latest version of the crypto refresh (i.e., !313, !314) specifies that
the "Hash" header is depricated. This commit changes that the Hash header
is only generated if a cleartext message contains a non-V6 signature.
The latest version of the crypto refresh (i.e., !313, !314) specifies that
the "Hash" header is deprecated, and that an implementation that is verifying
a cleartext signed message MUST ignore this header.
However, we go against this directive, and keep the checks in place to avoid
arbitrary injection of text as part of the "Hash" header payload.
We also mandate that if the hash header is present, the declared
algorithm matches the signature algorithm. This is again to avoid
a spoofing attack where e.g. a SHA1 signature is presented as
using SHA512.
Related CVEs: CVE-2019-11841, CVE-2023-41037.
This commit does not change the writing part of cleartext messages.
# Conflicts:
# src/cleartext.js
Introduces v6 one-pass signature packets required for v6 signatures.
Includes the changes from !305 of the crypto refresh:
https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis/-/merge_requests/305
Also, introduce `OnePassSignaturePacket.fromSignaturePacket` to simplify
OPS generation.
The Packet Tag space is now partitioned into critical packets and non-critical packets.
If an implementation encounters a critical packet where the packet type is unknown in a packet sequence,
it MUST reject the whole packet sequence. On the other hand, an unknown non-critical packet MUST be ignored.
See https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#section-4.3.1 .
Instead of calling getPreferredAlgo('symmetric') and
getPreferredAlgo('aead'), we define and call getPreferredCipherSuite()
to determine the preferred symmetric and AEAD algorithm.
Additionally, we remove isAEADSupported(), instead we return
aeadAlgorithm: undefined from getPreferredCipherSuite() if AEAD is not
supported (CFB is used instead).
And finally, we define getPreferredCompressionAlgo() to replace
getPreferredAlgo('compression').
The latest crypto refresh specifies an HKDF step to be used for
deriving the key to encrypt the session key with.
It also specifies two additional length fields.
The crypto refresh says that we MUST NOT reject messages where the
CRC24 checksum is incorrect. So, we remove the check for it.
Also, remove the checksumRequired config.
The noble-hashes fork uses the same fallback implementation,
except BN.js is always imported (due to lib contraints), so a dynamic import is now superfluous
Mocha v10 requires the lib to be esm compliant.
ESM mandates the use of file extensions in imports, so to minimize the
changes (for now), we rely on the flag `experimental-specifier-resolution=node`
and on `ts-node` (needed only for Node 20).
Breaking changes:
downstream bundlers might be affected by the package.json changes depending on
how they load the library.
NB: legacy package.json entrypoints are still available.
In terms of API, this feature is backwards compatible, no breaking changes.
However, since a Wasm module is loaded for the Argon2 computation, browser apps
might need to make changes to their CSP policy in order to use the feature.
Newly introduced config fields:
- `config.s2kType` (defaulting to `enums.s2k.iterated`): s2k to use on
password-based encryption as well as private key encryption;
- `config.s2kArgon2Params` (defaulting to "uniformly safe settings" from Argon
RFC): parameters to use on encryption when `config.s2kType` is set to
`enums.s2k.argon2`;
Set to replace `enums.curve.ed25519` (resp. `.curve25519`), which can still be used everywhere,
but it will be dropped in v6.
Deprecation notices have been added to ease transition.
Set to replace `enums.publicKey.eddsa`, which can still be used everywhere,
but it will be dropped in v6.
Deprecation notices have been added to ease transition.
