mirror of
https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs.git
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42d504a69a
This affects the preferences of newly generated keys, which by default will have SHA512 as first hash algo preference. SHA512 will also be used when signing, as long as the recipient keys declare support for the algorithm.
301 lines
15 KiB
JavaScript
301 lines
15 KiB
JavaScript
// GPG4Browsers - An OpenPGP implementation in javascript
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// Copyright (C) 2011 Recurity Labs GmbH
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//
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// This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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// modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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// License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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// version 3.0 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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//
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// This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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// Lesser General Public License for more details.
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//
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// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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// License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
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// Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
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/**
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* Global configuration values.
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*/
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import enums from '../enums';
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export default {
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Integer} preferredHashAlgorithm Default hash algorithm {@link module:enums.hash}
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*/
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preferredHashAlgorithm: enums.hash.sha512,
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Integer} preferredSymmetricAlgorithm Default encryption cipher {@link module:enums.symmetric}
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*/
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preferredSymmetricAlgorithm: enums.symmetric.aes256,
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Integer} compression Default compression algorithm {@link module:enums.compression}
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*/
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preferredCompressionAlgorithm: enums.compression.uncompressed,
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/**
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* Use Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) protection for symmetric encryption.
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* This option is applicable to:
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* - key generation (encryption key preferences),
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* - password-based message encryption, and
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* - private key encryption.
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* In the case of message encryption using public keys, the encryption key preferences are respected instead.
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* Note: not all OpenPGP implementations are compatible with this option.
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* @see {@link https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html|draft-crypto-refresh-10}
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} aeadProtect
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*/
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aeadProtect: false,
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/**
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* When reading OpenPGP v4 private keys (e.g. those generated in OpenPGP.js when not setting `config.v5Keys = true`)
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* which were encrypted by OpenPGP.js v5 (or older) using `config.aeadProtect = true`,
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* this option must be set, otherwise key parsing and/or key decryption will fail.
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* Note: only set this flag if you know that the keys are of the legacy type, as non-legacy keys
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* will be processed incorrectly.
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*/
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parseAEADEncryptedV4KeysAsLegacy: false,
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/**
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* Default Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) encryption mode
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* Only has an effect when aeadProtect is set to true.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Integer} preferredAEADAlgorithm Default AEAD mode {@link module:enums.aead}
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*/
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preferredAEADAlgorithm: enums.aead.gcm,
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/**
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* Chunk Size Byte for Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) mode
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* Only has an effect when aeadProtect is set to true.
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* Must be an integer value from 0 to 56.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Integer} aeadChunkSizeByte
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*/
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aeadChunkSizeByte: 12,
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/**
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* Use v6 keys.
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* Note: not all OpenPGP implementations are compatible with this option.
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* **FUTURE OPENPGP.JS VERSIONS MAY BREAK COMPATIBILITY WHEN USING THIS OPTION**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} v6Keys
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*/
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v6Keys: false,
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/**
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* Enable parsing v5 keys and v5 signatures (which is different from the AEAD-encrypted SEIPDv2 packet).
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* These are non-standard entities, which in the crypto-refresh have been superseded
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* by v6 keys and v6 signatures, respectively.
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* However, generation of v5 entities was supported behind config flag in OpenPGP.js v5, and some other libraries,
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* hence parsing them might be necessary in some cases.
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*/
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enableParsingV5Entities: false,
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/**
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* S2K (String to Key) type, used for key derivation in the context of secret key encryption
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* and password-encrypted data. Weaker s2k options are not allowed.
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* Note: Argon2 is the strongest option but not all OpenPGP implementations are compatible with it
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* (pending standardisation).
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {enums.s2k.argon2|enums.s2k.iterated} s2kType {@link module:enums.s2k}
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*/
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s2kType: enums.s2k.iterated,
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/**
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* {@link https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-3.7.1.3| RFC4880 3.7.1.3}:
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* Iteration Count Byte for Iterated and Salted S2K (String to Key).
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* Only relevant if `config.s2kType` is set to `enums.s2k.iterated`.
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* Note: this is the exponent value, not the final number of iterations (refer to specs for more details).
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Integer} s2kIterationCountByte
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*/
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s2kIterationCountByte: 224,
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/**
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* {@link https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-07.html#section-3.7.1.4| draft-crypto-refresh 3.7.1.4}:
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* Argon2 parameters for S2K (String to Key).
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* Only relevant if `config.s2kType` is set to `enums.s2k.argon2`.
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* Default settings correspond to the second recommendation from RFC9106 ("uniformly safe option"),
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* to ensure compatibility with memory-constrained environments.
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* For more details on the choice of parameters, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc9106#section-4.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Object} params
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* @property {Integer} params.passes - number of iterations t
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* @property {Integer} params.parallelism - degree of parallelism p
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* @property {Integer} params.memoryExponent - one-octet exponent indicating the memory size, which will be: 2**memoryExponent kibibytes.
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*/
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s2kArgon2Params: {
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passes: 3,
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parallelism: 4, // lanes
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memoryExponent: 16 // 64 MiB of RAM
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},
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/**
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* Allow decryption of messages without integrity protection.
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* This is an **insecure** setting:
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* - message modifications cannot be detected, thus processing the decrypted data is potentially unsafe.
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* - it enables downgrade attacks against integrity-protected messages.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} allowUnauthenticatedMessages
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*/
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allowUnauthenticatedMessages: false,
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/**
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* Allow streaming unauthenticated data before its integrity has been checked. This would allow the application to
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* process large streams while limiting memory usage by releasing the decrypted chunks as soon as possible
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* and deferring checking their integrity until the decrypted stream has been read in full.
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*
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* This setting is **insecure** if the encrypted data has been corrupted by a malicious entity:
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* - if the partially decrypted message is processed further or displayed to the user, it opens up the possibility of attacks such as EFAIL
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* (see https://efail.de/).
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* - an attacker with access to traces or timing info of internal processing errors could learn some info about the data.
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*
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* NB: this setting does not apply to AEAD-encrypted data, where the AEAD data chunk is never released until integrity is confirmed.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} allowUnauthenticatedStream
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*/
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allowUnauthenticatedStream: false,
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/**
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* Minimum RSA key size allowed for key generation and message signing, verification and encryption.
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* The default is 2047 since due to a bug, previous versions of OpenPGP.js could generate 2047-bit keys instead of 2048-bit ones.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Number} minRSABits
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*/
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minRSABits: 2047,
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/**
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* Work-around for rare GPG decryption bug when encrypting with multiple passwords.
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* **Slower and slightly less secure**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} passwordCollisionCheck
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*/
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passwordCollisionCheck: false,
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/**
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* Allow decryption using RSA keys without `encrypt` flag.
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* This setting is potentially insecure, but it is needed to get around an old openpgpjs bug
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* where key flags were ignored when selecting a key for encryption.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} allowInsecureDecryptionWithSigningKeys
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*/
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allowInsecureDecryptionWithSigningKeys: false,
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/**
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* Allow verification of message signatures with keys whose validity at the time of signing cannot be determined.
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* Instead, a verification key will also be consider valid as long as it is valid at the current time.
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* This setting is potentially insecure, but it is needed to verify messages signed with keys that were later reformatted,
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* and have self-signature's creation date that does not match the primary key creation date.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} allowInsecureDecryptionWithSigningKeys
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*/
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allowInsecureVerificationWithReformattedKeys: false,
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/**
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* Allow using keys that do not have any key flags set.
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* Key flags are needed to restrict key usage to specific purposes: for instance, a signing key could only be allowed to certify other keys, and not sign messages
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* (see https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-10.html#section-5.2.3.29).
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* Some older keys do not declare any key flags, which means they are not allowed to be used for any operation.
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* This setting allows using such keys for any operation for which they are compatible, based on their public key algorithm.
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*/
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allowMissingKeyFlags: false,
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/**
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* Enable constant-time decryption of RSA- and ElGamal-encrypted session keys, to hinder Bleichenbacher-like attacks (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/BFb0055716).
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* This setting has measurable performance impact and it is only helpful in application scenarios where both of the following conditions apply:
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* - new/incoming messages are automatically decrypted (without user interaction);
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* - an attacker can determine how long it takes to decrypt each message (e.g. due to decryption errors being logged remotely).
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* See also `constantTimePKCS1DecryptionSupportedSymmetricAlgorithms`.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} constantTimePKCS1Decryption
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*/
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constantTimePKCS1Decryption: false,
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/**
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* This setting is only meaningful if `constantTimePKCS1Decryption` is enabled.
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* Decryption of RSA- and ElGamal-encrypted session keys of symmetric algorithms different from the ones specified here will fail.
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* However, the more algorithms are added, the slower the decryption procedure becomes.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Set<Integer>} constantTimePKCS1DecryptionSupportedSymmetricAlgorithms {@link module:enums.symmetric}
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*/
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constantTimePKCS1DecryptionSupportedSymmetricAlgorithms: new Set([enums.symmetric.aes128, enums.symmetric.aes192, enums.symmetric.aes256]),
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} ignoreUnsupportedPackets Ignore unsupported/unrecognizable packets on parsing instead of throwing an error
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*/
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ignoreUnsupportedPackets: true,
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} ignoreMalformedPackets Ignore malformed packets on parsing instead of throwing an error
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*/
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ignoreMalformedPackets: false,
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/**
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* Parsing of packets is normally restricted to a predefined set of packets. For example a Sym. Encrypted Integrity Protected Data Packet can only
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* contain a certain set of packets including LiteralDataPacket. With this setting we can allow additional packets, which is probably not advisable
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* as a global config setting, but can be used for specific function calls (e.g. decrypt method of Message).
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Array} additionalAllowedPackets Allow additional packets on parsing. Defined as array of packet classes, e.g. [PublicKeyPacket]
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*/
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additionalAllowedPackets: [],
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} showVersion Whether to include {@link module:config/config.versionString} in armored messages
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*/
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showVersion: false,
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} showComment Whether to include {@link module:config/config.commentString} in armored messages
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*/
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showComment: false,
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {String} versionString A version string to be included in armored messages
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*/
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versionString: 'OpenPGP.js VERSION',
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/**
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {String} commentString A comment string to be included in armored messages
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*/
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commentString: 'https://openpgpjs.org',
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/**
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* Max userID string length (used for parsing)
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Integer} maxUserIDLength
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*/
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maxUserIDLength: 1024 * 5,
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/**
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* Contains notatations that are considered "known". Known notations do not trigger
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* validation error when the notation is marked as critical.
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Array} knownNotations
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*/
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knownNotations: [],
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/**
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* If true, a salt notation is used to randomize signatures generated by v4 and v5 keys (v6 signatures are always non-deterministic, by design).
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* This protects EdDSA signatures from potentially leaking the secret key in case of faults (i.e. bitflips) which, in principle, could occur
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* during the signing computation. It is added to signatures of any algo for simplicity, and as it may also serve as protection in case of
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* weaknesses in the hash algo, potentially hindering e.g. some chosen-prefix attacks.
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* NOTE: the notation is interoperable, but will reveal that the signature has been generated using OpenPGP.js, which may not be desirable in some cases.
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*/
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nonDeterministicSignaturesViaNotation: true,
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/**
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* Whether to use the the noble-curves library for curves (other than Curve25519) that are not supported by the available native crypto API.
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* When false, certain standard curves will not be supported (depending on the platform).
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Boolean} useEllipticFallback
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*/
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useEllipticFallback: true,
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/**
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* Reject insecure hash algorithms
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Set<Integer>} rejectHashAlgorithms {@link module:enums.hash}
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*/
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rejectHashAlgorithms: new Set([enums.hash.md5, enums.hash.ripemd]),
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/**
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* Reject insecure message hash algorithms
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Set<Integer>} rejectMessageHashAlgorithms {@link module:enums.hash}
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*/
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rejectMessageHashAlgorithms: new Set([enums.hash.md5, enums.hash.ripemd, enums.hash.sha1]),
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/**
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* Reject insecure public key algorithms for key generation and message encryption, signing or verification
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Set<Integer>} rejectPublicKeyAlgorithms {@link module:enums.publicKey}
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*/
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rejectPublicKeyAlgorithms: new Set([enums.publicKey.elgamal, enums.publicKey.dsa]),
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/**
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* Reject non-standard curves for key generation, message encryption, signing or verification
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* @memberof module:config
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* @property {Set<String>} rejectCurves {@link module:enums.curve}
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*/
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rejectCurves: new Set([enums.curve.secp256k1])
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};
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