We have following communication schema:
client --- 1 ---> grpc-proxy --- 2 --- > etcd-server
There are 2 sets of flags/certs in grpc proxy [ https://github.com/etcd-io/etcd/blob/master/etcdmain/grpc_proxy.go#L140 ]:
A. (cert-file, key-file, trusted-ca-file, auto-tls) this are controlling [1] so client to proxy connection and in particular they are describing proxy public identity.
B. (cert,key, cacert ) - these are controlling [2] so what's the identity that proxy uses to make connections to the etcd-server.
If 2 (B.) contains certificate with CN and etcd-server is running with --client-cert-auth=true, the CN can be used as identity of 'client' from service perspective. This is permission escalation, that we should forbid.
If 1 (A.) contains certificate with CN - it should be considered perfectly valid. The server can (should) have full identity.
So only --cert flag (and not --cert-file flag) should be validated for empty CN.
os.MkdirAll creates directory before umask so make sure that a desired
permission is set after creating a directory with MkdirAll. Use the
existing TouchDirAll function which checks for permission if dir is already
exist and when create a new dir.
This makes it possible to run an etcd node for testing and development
without placing lots of load on the file system.
Fixes#11930.
Signed-off-by: David Crawshaw <crawshaw@tailscale.com>
This change makes the etcd package compatible with the existing Go
ecosystem for module versioning.
Used this tool to update package imports:
https://github.com/KSubedi/gomove
Currently grpc-proxy doesn't config keep alive related options, so it
will use the default values provided by the underlay gprc library. If
clients uses a keep alive ping interval smaller than server's default
minTime, connections between server and clients will be closed and
reopened frequently.
To make it easier to root-cause when /health check fails.
For example, we are using load balancer to health check
each etcd instance, and when one etcd node gets terminated,
it's hard to tell whether etcd "server" was really failing
or client (or load balancer") failed to reach the etcd cluster
which is also failure in load balancer health check.
Signed-off-by: Gyuho Lee <leegyuho@amazon.com>
Version flag is meant for displaying version and it's a boolean.
It's for an internal use, and we may not want users to set
it in the environment.
Fixes # 11210
Etcd currently supports validating peers based on their TLS certificate's
CN field. The current best practice for creation and validation of TLS
certs is to use the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) fields instead, so that
a certificate might be issued with a unique CN and its logical
identities in the SANs.
This commit extends the peer validation logic to use Go's
`(*"crypto/x509".Certificate).ValidateHostname` function for name
validation, which allows SANs to be used for peer access control.
In addition, it allows name validation to be enabled on clients as well.
This is used when running Etcd behind an authenticating proxy, or as
an internal component in a larger system (like a Kubernetes master).
